The Australian Parliament is currently considering the Religious Discrimination Bill, 2019 - which is currently on its second exposure draft. The Bill is motivated by what some Christians view as increasing discrimination against religion and the religious, and specifically Christianity in Australian society. The two factors motivating the Bill at this time have been the passing of Marriage Amendment (Definitions and Religious Freedom) Act, 2017; and the Israel Folau incident, in which Israel Folau was sacked by the Australian Rugby Union for making claims on his Instagram account about about supposed fate of homosexuals and atheists (among others) in the hands of a purportedly good God.
While many Christians see both events as discrimination against religion, I see things very differently. The Marriage Amendment Act partially ended one of the longest running institutional examples of religious discrimination in Australian society. Prior to that act, Australian marriage law was based on a particular, Christian view of marriage. In consequence, Christian practice was enforced on all Australians who wanted to marry, regardless of their religious beliefs. Even now, Australian law forbids polygamous (or polyandrous) marriage, thereby imposing Christian values on members of the world's second largest religion (among others). That is just as much discrimination as would be a law requiring Christians to only eat Halal foods.
Israel Folau's case is more informative. It is a general principle that an act is only discriminatory it adversely effects the group being discriminated against deliberately, or recklessly and without proper purpose. Thus if somebody were required to not preach their religion in particular circumstances, and the requirement was not intended as an attack on their religion, and the the reason for the requirement was valid, then the partial limitation on their ability to proclaim their religion would not be an example of religious discrimination. As an obvious example of this, should a patron at a movie theater stand up, and start loudly proclaiming religious views, their exclusion from that theater would not constitute religious discrimination. You could in no way infer the theater's manager's views on religion from that act; and the purpose for the eviction,ie, to secure for the theaters patrons the right to enjoy the movie in peace, was entirely legitimate.
In Israel Folau's case, he was an employee of the Australian Rugby Union. As such, his employer had certain limited rights to restrict his right of free expression. In general, these rights are limited to when the employee is at the work place, or in work uniform, or is otherwise clearly associated with their employer such that a reasonable person could infer the views expressed are supported by their employer. In general, those restrictions are very limited (although employers seek to expand them, without any action being taken to protect normal employees from that restriction of their rights by the current government).
Israel Folau, however, was not just an employee, but a paid spokesperson for the ARU. He appeared in many advertisements for the ARU, and for the ARUs sponsors, clearly identifying his name with their brand. An employee in such a position has a far greater restriction to his freedom of speech, simply because that association means it is nearly always the case "...that a reasonable person could infer the views expressed are supported by their employer." The ARU had not at any stage disciplined Folau for expressing equivalent views from the pulpit; where the fact of being in a pulpit marked the views as Folau's exclusively. It follows that the ARU were not opposed to the expression of religious views as such, but by Folau's associating them with religious views that many (including myself) find offensive.
Looking back to the criteria of an action being non-discriminatory, even when it actually imposes restrictions; the ARU's actions clearly meet that criteria. Their intent was not to restrict the expression of religious views per se (as shown by their not disciplining Folau for comments in the pulpit). Their purpose in restricting Folau's social media - ie, to protect the good name of the ARU and of its sponsors - was genuine and reasonable. Therefore any restriction on Folau's right of religious expression was merely incidental, and the act was not discriminatory. Had Folau recognized, this, he could perhaps have renegotiated his contract with a provision that his name and image were not to be used in ARU advertizing so that he ceased to be an ARU spokesperson, and that in consequence he would be free to say as he pleased on social media. Had he done so, I would have supported his decision. Instead he made a false claim of religious discrimination.
The response of many Christians has been to demand protection of speech similar to Israel Folau's in the name of preventing "discrimination based on religion". As a result, we have a bill before parliament which would make it illegal in most circumstances, for an employer to fire an employee for declaring their religious beliefs - even if in uniform, in the work place, and while serving a customer. The bill grants this privilege exclusively to religious speech. Were an employee in a similar circumstance to express their political, or ethical views, they could be disciplined by their employer, and potentially sacked - something about which the Australian government gives not a fig.
The fact is that employers can have a genuine interest in not having their customers insulted, or told that they are sinners, or that they are going to hell. Customers faced with that sort of behaviour are unlikely to make a purchase, and are unlikely to be repeat customers. The previous standard of behaviour that applied to all speech in the work place is to up ended by the Religious Discrimination Bill, and be replaced by a standard where religious speech is given a special privilege in society. That is to say, the bill will enact positive discrimination in favour of the religious, rather than ending the discrimination against them. It is another example of granting to the religous a privileged status in society under the ruse of preventing discrimination against them.
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